In Singapore, international arbitration is governed by the International Arbitration Act (IAA), the Arbitration Act (AA) and the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act. The legislative framework, which is substantially based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”), and the Courts’ pro-arbitration approach to the application of the legislative framework ensure that Singapore continues to remain a leading arbitration hub in the region and globally.
In 2025, there were a number of significant cases which further developed the law of arbitration in Singapore, in particular in relation to the setting aside of awards on the grounds of apparent bias and breach of natural justice, the enforcement of awards, the grant of anti-suit injunctions to restrain breaches of arbitration agreements and the jurisdiction of the Courts over an arbitral institution’s procedural determinations.
In general, these cases demonstrate that the Singapore Courts adopt a commercial and practical approach which gives primacy to the parties’ intentions in choosing arbitration as their means of dispute resolution, while exercising their supervisory jurisdiction where required to protect the legitimacy of arbitration.
Court of Appeal sets aside award which relied on material from parallel arbitrations
In DJP and others v DJO [2025] 1 SLR 576, a consortium (which was comprised of the appellants) had entered into a construction contract with the respondent for construction works in India (the “CPT-13 Contract”). Following a notification by the Indian Ministry of Labour and Employment that the daily rates of minimum wages payable to workmen in India was to be increased (the “Notification”), the appellants lodged a claim with the respondent for additional payment pursuant to the terms of the CPT-13 Contract. When the respondent rejected this claim, the appellants commenced arbitration proceedings (the “Arbitration”).
Around the same time, two separate consortiums had also commenced arbitration proceedings against the respondent; these consortiums were similarly seeking additional payment arising from the Notification (the “Parallel Arbitrations”). The Arbitration and the Parallel Arbitrations were heard by the same presiding arbitrator (the “President”) but the co-arbitrators in the Arbitration (the “Co-arbitrators”) were not involved in the Parallel Arbitrations. Additionally, there were material differences between the CPT-13 Contract and the underlying contracts considered in the Parallel Arbitrations.
The award in the Arbitration was issued (the “Award”) after the awards in the Parallel Arbitrations were issued (the “Parallel Awards”). It was later discovered that the Award was strikingly similar to the Parallel Awards, with at least 212 paragraphs in the 451-paragraph Award being reproduced from the Parallel Awards. On this basis, the respondent successfully applied to the Singapore International Commercial Court (the “SICC”) to set aside the Award on the basis that it was made in breach of the rules of natural justice under section 24(b) of the International Arbitration Act 1994.
On appeal, the appellants contended that the Award had been wrongly set aside. Among other things, the appellant argued that the three arbitrations raised similar issues and to the extent that the parties advanced similar arguments, it was not objectionable for the tribunal to have reproduced the relevant paragraphs from the Parallel Awards in the Award.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeal, and held that the award was tainted by apparent bias. A fair‑minded observer would be left with the reasonable suspicion that the tribunal had failed to keep an open mind, having been influenced by both anchoring bias and confirmation bias arising from the Parallel Awards that had been rendered earlier. This concern was reinforced by the identical resolution of common issues across all three arbitrations, despite differences in the parties’ arguments, as well as errors in the award such as references to the wrong contract.
The Court also set aside the Award on the basis of a breach of the rules of natural justice, given that the Award was drafted with substantial reference to material that the parties had not been given an opportunity to review or submit on. Further, the Co-arbitrators had no direct access to the material or knowledge derived from the Parallel Arbitrations, but such material and knowledge appeared to have significantly influenced the outcome of the Arbitration. In this manner, the expectation of equality between the members of the tribunal had been breached, further compromising the integrity of the Arbitration.
Court of Appeal sets aside award for breach of natural justice in “documents-only” arbitration
Where the right to be heard has been breached, the Singapore Courts may refuse enforcement or set aside an award where such breach has prejudiced a party. In Wan Sern Metal Industries Pte Ltd v Hua Tian Engineering Pte Ltd [2025] 1 SLR 88, the Court of Appeal set aside an award in a “documents-only” arbitration, in circumstances where the arbitrator had acted in breach of natural justice by failing to apply her mind to the parties’ cases in respect of an issue concerning the respondent’s claim for expectation damages. The respondent had introduced the issue of expectation damages in an unpleaded manner, and although the appellant had objected to the respondent’s valuation of its claim, the arbitrator failed to appreciate the precise point that the appellant had taken. As the Court noted, it was not clear that the arbitrator had even appreciated the fact that the respondent had raised an unpleaded claim when it raised the issue of its entitlement to expectation damages. The arbitrator’s failure to apply her mind caused actual prejudice, as the quantum of damages that the appellant was obliged to pay to the respondent would have to be adjusted if the arbitrator was found to have acted in breach of natural justice.
The Court also noted that given the expedited manner in which the arbitration was conducted and the fact that it would be determined based on the documents alone, there was a lack of clarity as to the parties’ positions which the arbitrator could and should have acted to resolve. Steps that a tribunal could take might include clarifying whether the parties are aware that an unpleaded issue has been introduced, whether the aggrieved party wishes to object to this introduction or otherwise respond to the issue, and whether the pleadings should be amended. It was especially important in a documents-only arbitration that a tribunal clarified with the parties whether it may decide an issue that has not been pleaded.
Court of Appeal refuses enforcement of award in light of non-compliance with unless order
In Wuhu Ruyi Xinbo Investment Partnership (Ltd Partnership) v European Topsoho Sàrl [2025] 2 SLR 383, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the General Division of the High Court (“High Court“) to dismiss the enforcement action brought by the arbitral creditor, Wuhu Ruyi Xinbo Investment Partnership (“Xinbo“), after it breached an “unless order” to disclose documents relevant to the arbitration. In finding that Xinbo had breached the unless order, the Court also rejected Xinbo’s submission that it should engage in a de novo reassessment of proportionality when deciding to enforce the consequences stemming from an intentional breach of an unless order. The Court explained that it would have already considered the proportionality of the stated consequence(s) against the specified condition(s) when deciding to impose an unless order.
The Court also upheld the High Court’s dismissal of Xinbo’s argument that giving effect to the unless order would be tantamount to fashioning a new ground for refusing enforcement in contravention of the exhaustive grounds of challenge set out in the New York Convention. Article III of the New York Convention expressly recognised that arbitral awards could only be recognised “in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon”. The “rules of procedure” logically encompassed the court’s authority to impose and enforce unless orders in order to secure the production of relevant documents, even where the enforcement results in dismissing an application to enforce an arbitral award. In such instances, the non-enforcement flowed directly from the award creditor’s failure to comply with the forum’s procedural rules, rather than from any implied additional ground under the New York Convention.
SICC grants anti-suit injunction against foreign proceedings seeking to set aside arbitration decision
In Cooperativa Muratori and Cementisti – CMC di Ravenna, Italy v Department of Water Supply & Sewerage Management, Kathmandu and another [2025] 4 SLR 983, the SICC granted an anti‑suit injunction restraining the Melamchi Water Supply Development Board (“MB”) from pursuing Nepalese court proceedings to set aside an arbitral tribunal’s decision that Singapore was the seat of a Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) arbitration. The underlying contract between MB and the claimant, Cooperativa Muratori and Cementisti – CMC di Ravenna, Italy (“CMC”), provided for Singapore as the “Place of Arbitration”. After the tribunal determined that Singapore was the seat, MB commenced annulment proceedings in Nepal challenging that decision, prompting CMC to seek injunctive relief in Singapore.
In granting the injunction, the SICC clarified the analytical framework for anti‑suit injunctions, emphasising the distinction between contractual anti‑suit injunctions (i.e., to enforce a forum or arbitration agreement) and non‑contractual anti-suit injunctions (i.e., to prevent undue interference or vexatious / oppressive conduct). For contractual anti‑suit injunctions, the Court identified three requirements: (i) the defendant is subject to the court’s in personam jurisdiction; (ii) the foreign proceedings are brought in breach of the parties’ agreement; and (iii) there are no strong reasons to decline enforcement of that agreement. On the facts, the SICC found that MB was subject to its jurisdiction by virtue of the parties’ choice of Singapore as the arbitral seat. Further, the annulment application in Nepal breached the arbitration agreement, and there were no strong reasons to refuse relief, particularly as the Nepal proceedings were still at an early stage.
The SICC also briefly considered the question of whether MB was entitled to sovereign immunity in accordance with the State Immunity Act 1979 (“SIA”). The Court held that MB was a separate entity from the Nepalese government and was accordingly not entitled to immunity given that the dispute arose out of a commercial transaction.
Court of Appeal holds that it has no power to set aside SIAC Registrar’s decision
In DMZ v DNA [2025] 2 SLR 398, the Singapore Court of Appeal held that it did not have the power to set aside a decision by the Registrar of the SIAC regarding the commencement date of the arbitration.
In this case, the commencement date was material as it could have resulted in the respondent’s claims being time-barred. However, the significance of this point was not initially brought to the attention of the Registrar of the SIAC when the Notice of Arbitration was filed. As some time elapsed between the filing of the Notice of Arbitration and the respondent answering queries from the Registrar as to the arbitration clauses relied upon, the Registrar initially decided that the date of commencement was the date on which the respondent answered the Registrar’s queries. However, by the time the respondent had replied to the Registrar, the applicable limitation period for the claims had likely expired.
Subsequently, the respondent submitted a request to the Registrar to amend the commencement date. After hearing the parties’ submissions, the Registrar decided to amend the commencement date to an earlier date, namely, when the Notice of Arbitration was filed (the “Amended Decision”). The upshot of the Amended Decision was that the respondents’ claims were no longer time-barred. Thereafter, the appellants applied to the High Court to set aside the Amended Decision, and subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal after its application was dismissed.
In dismissing the appeal, the Court first examined Article 5 of the Model Law, which provides that “[i]n matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law”. The Court set out a two-step inquiry to determine whether Article 5 applied to circumscribe the court’s power in a particular case. At the first step, the court determines whether the application for the court’s intervention concerned a “matter” governed by the Model Law. At the second step, the court considers whether the intended intervention was permitted, either (a) because the legislation made express provision for such intervention, or (b) if the “matter” was not governed by the relevant legislation, then because the grant of relief was warranted.
The appellant failed at the first step of the inquiry as its application to set aside the Amended Decision was a “matter” governed by the Model Law, and therefore fell within the scope of Article 5. In reaching its decision, the Court found that the word “matter” should be interpreted broadly and encompass challenges against a procedural determination which would affect the progress or conduct of an ongoing arbitration, such as in the present case.
The Court also held that rule 40.2 of the SIAC Arbitration Rules (6th Ed, 1 August 2016), which stated that the parties waived their rights of appeal or review in respect of any decisions of the Registrar (outside of prescribed exceptions), also meant that the application to set aside the Amended Decision could not succeed.
