David Zaslowsky, Mark Goodman, Barry Thompson, and Tom Tysowsky
A. Legislation and Rule
In the United States, arbitration-related rulemaking and legislation take place at both the federal (national) and state levels. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (the “FAA”) remains the controlling federal arbitration statute and reflects an established national policy strongly favoring arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. There has been no federal legislation in the past year that amends or alters the FAA. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2018 (section 2591) — which would prohibit enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment, consumer, antitrust and civil rights disputes — passed by the House of Representatives but has yet to be reviewed by the Senate.
Beginning in 2018, a number of states enacted statutes curtailing or prohibiting arbitration of employment claims relating specifically to sexual harassment and discrimination. For example, in 2019, New Jersey amended its statute to prohibit employers from requiring employees to waive certain rights and this amendment has been interpreted to bar mandatory arbitration of discrimination, retaliation and harassment claims. Similarly, the Illinois Workplace Transparency Act became effective on 1 January 2020 and prohibits mandatory arbitration agreements requiring employees to arbitrate employment-related claims.
At the state level, courts have continued to hold that the FAA pre-empts certain state-based legislation. In 2019, the California Legislature signed Assembly Bill 51 (AB 51), prohibiting employers from requiring employees to waive rights provided by the Fair Employment and Housing Act, including the right to file a complaint for discrimination. Before AB 51 became effective on 1 January 2020, a district court enjoined the law’s enforcement on the grounds that AB51 is likely preempted by the FAA. The matter is still pending appeal. The New York State Legislature enacted a law in 2018 prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in the discrimination context and, since then, New York courts have issued split decisions on whether the statute is pre-empted by the FAA. One federal court held that the FAA preempts the state law but, in July 2020, a New York state court held that a mandatory arbitration clause in an employment agreement is unenforceable under New York law.
Several government agencies have, in recent years, issued rules addressing arbitration and courts have issued opinions regarding whether such rules are pre-empted. For example, in 2020, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority proposed a rule that would modify its Code of Arbitration Procedure and process relating to the expungement of customer dispute information. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Department of Health and Human Services promulgated a rule that prohibited long-term care facilities from receiving Medicare and Medicaid funding if such facilities required residents to sign binding arbitration agreements. Though the rule was enjoined by a federal court in 2019, and the core of the rule was repealed, CMS’s final rule continues to include provisions that prohibit long-term care facilities from mandating arbitration of disputes. By contrast, in April 2020, a federal court held that the 2019 rule does not conflict with the FAA, is a valid condition on federal funds and was within the government’s authority to promulgate.
A.2 Institutions, rules and infrastructure
The major arbitral institutions in the US include JAMS, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), which is the international arm of the AAA.
JAMS is headquartered in Irvine, California, but maintains offices in 27 locations throughout North America and the United Kingdom. JAMS has added a new model diversity and inclusion clause in their sample dispute resolution clauses for commercial contracts. Otherwise, no changes have been made to the JAMS rules or materials. The ICDR and AAA, headquartered in New York, have not changed their rules over the past year.
CPR, headquartered in New York, revised its Rules for Administered Arbitration (domestic and international versions), effective March 2019. The major changes include:
- Rule 3: The revised domestic Rules for Administered Arbitration clarify procedures for joinder of parties and consolidation of cases, in keeping with pre-existing Rule 3 for International Disputes.
- Rule 5: Cases not exceeding USD 3 million now must be heard by a single arbitrator, unless the tribunal decides that the case should be heard by three arbitrators or the parties agree otherwise. The revised rule also provides that CPR’s Screened Selection process shall be used as a default where the tribunal consists of three arbitrators, unless the parties agree otherwise.
- Rule 9: This rule now requires parties to address cybersecurity issues at the initial pre-hearing conference.
- Rule 12: CPR has included a provision allowing the tribunal to direct lead counsel to permit more junior lawyers to examine witnesses at hearings and present argument. The tribunal may permit lead counsel to provide assistance or support the junior lawyer in examining witnesses or making arguments. Rule 12 also now clarifies tribunal procedures for the early disposition of claims, counterclaims, defenses and other issues, in keeping with the CPR Guidelines for Early Disposition of Issues in Arbitration.
- Rule 14: “Special” arbitrators are now referred to as “Emergency” Arbitrators.
- Rule 21: The revised rules authorize CPR to contact parties during arbitration to invite mediation.
Although these changes were not made directly to the foregoing institutions’ rules, the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a widespread shift to virtual arbitration proceedings throughout the year, leading to numerous announcements and advisory updates meant to inform clients and counsel of important guidance and principles relating to virtual arbitrations.
B.1 US Supreme Court unanimously rules that New York Convention does not prohibit non-signatories from compelling arbitration based on the application of domestic equitable estoppel doctrine.
The Supreme Court decided one arbitration case in 2020, GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC. In a unanimous opinion, the court ruled that the New York Convention permits a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement to compel arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, declining to accept Outokumpu’s invitation to treat international arbitration agreements differently from domestic arbitration agreements.
Outokumpu, the owner of a steel manufacturing plant, entered into contracts with F.L. Industries, Inc. for cold rolling mills. These contracts contained arbitration agreements. F.L. Industries entered into subcontracts with GE for the production of the motors for the mills. The motors allegedly failed and Outokumpu filed suit against GE in Alabama state court. GE removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration of the dispute. The US District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted the motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the action. Outokumpu appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the order compelling arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit held that only signatories (or their privies) to an arbitration agreement governed by the New York Convention were entitled to compel arbitration and, because GE did not sign the arbitration agreement with Outokumpu, GE could not compel arbitration by invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
In reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit sided with the Ninth Circuit’s 2017 conclusion, in Yang v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, that the New York Convention “does not allow non-signatories or non-parties to compel arbitration” and rejected contrary holdings of the First and Fourth Circuits. In 2008, the First Circuit, in Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., had held that the New York Convention incorporates the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which “precludes a party from enjoying rights and benefits under a contract while at the same time avoiding its burdens and obligations.” The Fourth Circuit, in Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH in 2000, and in Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co. in 2012, twice held that equitable estoppel applies to arbitration agreements subject to the New York Convention. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision thus deepened the circuit split on this issue. GE filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking reversal and resolution of the circuit split.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, holding that the New York Convention does not conflict with the enforcement of arbitration agreements by non-signatories under domestic-law equitable estoppel doctrines. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether GE could compel arbitration under equitable estoppel principles on the facts of the case.
In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court explained: the text of the New York Convention does not prohibit the application of domestic equitable estoppel doctrines; the Convention’s drafting history does not indicate any intention to prohibit courts from applying domestic law that would allow non-signatories to compel arbitration; and the weight of authority from contracting states indicates that the New York Convention does not prohibit the application of domestic law addressing the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Importantly, the Supreme Court’s recent Outokumpu decision is consistent with its 2009 decision in Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, where it determined that the FAA does not “alter background principles of state contract law regarding the scope of agreements (including the question of who is bound by them).” In Arthur Andersen, the Supreme Court recognized that the FAA permits a non-signatory to rely on state-law equitable estoppel doctrines to enforce an arbitration agreement. Had the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling and accepted Outokumpu’s position, international arbitration agreements would have been placed on an entirely different footing than domestic arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court thus resolved a split among the Circuits and maintained consistency in the treatment of domestic and international arbitration agreements in the United States.
B.2 Circuit courts split on the use of section 1782 in aid of private, commercial international arbitration.
Section 1782 of Title 28 of the US Code is a statute that provides for US-style discovery in aid of foreign proceedings. The statute provides, in relevant part, that discovery is available “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” Therefore, an important question is whether an international, commercial arbitration is considered “a foreign or international tribunal” under section 1782 so that the statute can be used to obtain discovery in aid of private, international arbitration proceedings.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,, the two circuit courts that addressed the issue – Nat. Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. (“NBC”) and Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l both held that section 1782 was not so available. In Intel, however, Justice Ginsberg quoted from an article written by the late Professor Hans Smit, the primary draftsperson of the current version of section 1782, in which he wrote “[t]he term ‘tribunal’ … includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative courts.” After Intel, although numerous courts held that Intel did not overrule NBC and Biedermann, and that section 1782 was not available in aid of private, international arbitration, there were other courts that held that section 1782 was so available. At the circuit court level, the Fifth Circuit expressly affirmed that Biedermann remains good law post-Intel. Last year, the Sixth Circuit created a circuit split when it became the first circuit court to hold that section 1782 could be used in aid of a private, international arbitration – see Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.
2020 saw the circuit split deepen. In Servotronics v. Boeing Co., the Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Sixth. The court noted that, in the 1964 changes to the statute, Congress deleted from the former version of the statute the words “in any judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country” and replaced them with the phrase “in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” (emphasis in original). According to the Fourth Circuit, Congress understood this to be an increase in international cooperation. The court also referred to Supreme Court decisions that said that the FAA elevated arbitration as a favored alternative to litigation. The FAA declared arbitration agreements to be valid and enforceable, directed courts to compel arbitration when a contract provides for arbitration, and provided for limited review of arbitral awards. Thus, according to the court, Boeing/Rolls Royce was wrong in its general assertion that arbitration is not a product of “government-conferred authority.”
The Second Circuit weighed in next. In In Re Application of Hanwei Guo for an Order to Take Discovery for Use in a Foreign Proceeding Pursuant to 28 USC. section 1782, the petitioner sought section 1782 discovery in aid of a CIETAC arbitration (the largest arbitral institution in China). The Second Circuit noted the Fourth and Sixth Circuit decisions that had gone the other way. But it decided that NBC remained good law. Critically, the question of whether foreign private arbitral bodies qualify as tribunals under section 1782(a) was not before the Intel court, which considered only whether the Directorate General-Competition, a public entity, qualified as such a tribunal. The fleeting reference in dicta to the Smit article was not a sufficient basis to undermine a prior opinion of the Court as to deprive it of precedential force. Moreover, the dicta was not definitively at odds with NBC in that Professor Smit’s reference to “arbitral tribunals” does not necessarily encompass private tribunals.
In September 2020, the Seventh Circuit had the last word in Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC.  The Seventh Circuit discussed the history of the split in the courts on the issue and then sided with the Second and Fifth Circuits in holding that section 1782 is not available in aid of private arbitration. Like the Second Circuit, it held that the plain meaning of the word “tribunal” was not conclusive because it could be understood to mean only state-sponsored tribunals, but it also could be understood to include private arbitration panels. Thus, the court turned to the legislative history and concluded that it did not support the conclusion that the statute should be used in private arbitration.
The Seventh and Fourth Circuit decisions involved the same parties and the courts went in opposite directions. Rolls Royce has asked the Supreme Court to review the case in order to resolve this circuit split. The court will decide in 2021 whether to hear the further appeal.
B.3 United States district court grants request to recognize and enforce interim arbitration award for an arbitration cost advance that a claimant paid when the respondent refused to pay its share of the advance.
A collection of Swedish technology start-up entrepreneurs owning shares in the Bluetooth headphone company, Earin AB (“Petitioners”), sought damages from I.Am.Plus Electronics, Inc. (“Respondent”) for breaching a contract under which the Respondent agreed to purchase Earin AB. The Petitioners filed a request for arbitration with the Arbitration Institute of the SCC to resolve the dispute.
Article 51(3) of the SCC Arbitration Rules states that parties must pay the arbitration costs upfront. When the Respondent failed to respond to the SCC’s request for payment, the Petitioners volunteered to pay the Respondent’s half to avoid dismissal of the case. Having received the full payment from the Petitioners, the SCC’s Secretariat referred the matter to the Arbitration tribunal. The Petitioners then immediately filed a request for an independent and separate award for reimbursement of those fees (“Separate Award“). The Respondent did not submit any comments to the arbitration tribunal throughout its consideration of the Separate Award, despite receiving two opportunities to do so. The arbitration tribunal granted the Separate Award.
The Petitioners thereafter moved to enforce the Separate Award in the US District Court for the Central District of California. The Respondent opposed the application, arguing that the district court should not enforce the Separate Award because it was not a final and binding award and because the Petitioners had failed to demonstrate a need for immediate relief. The district court found that the New York Convention applied, disagreed with both arguments, and granted the motion to enforce the Separate Award.
The district court acknowledged that judicial review of non-final arbitration awards is generally disfavored. However, it went on to note that courts can confirm interim arbitral awards when they finally and conclusively resolve a discrete issue, which it held was the situation here. The district court therefore granted the Petitioner’s motion to recognize and enforce the Separate Award.
B.4 The New Jersey Supreme Court holds that arbitration agreements are not invalid for failure to designate a specific arbitrator or arbitration organization or prescribing a process for such a designation.
The New Jersey Arbitration Act, like the FAA, permits a court to step in when the parties have not agreed on a specific arbitrator or designated a method of choosing an arbitrator or if the process has failed.
The district court denied Intuit’s motion to compel arbitration on the basis of this arbitration clause. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that, while mutual manifestation of assent was needed to enter into a contract, even an “internet contract,” an offeree will be bound by an arbitration agreement if a reasonably prudent Internet user would be on inquiry notice of the agreement’s existence and its contents.
The Ninth Circuit explained that there are two types of Internet agreements: (1) “clickwrap,” where the internet user must click an “I Agree” box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use, and (2) “browsewrap,” where the website’s terms and conditions are posted via a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen. The Ninth Circuit explained that they are more willing to find the requisite notice for browsewrap agreements where the website contains an explicit textual notice that continued use of the site acts as a manifestation of the user’s intent to be bound.
B.6 Tenth Circuit affirms district court’s decision that arbitration awards cannot be modified unless a material miscalculation appears on the face of the award.
This dispute involved a married couple Beverly Bien and David Wellman, who made investments with a brokerage firm, Mid Atlantic. Those investments performed poorly, leading the couple to initiate mandatory arbitration proceedings against the brokerage firm in 2015 to recoup their losses, alleging that Mid Atlantic sold them unreasonably risky investments. An arbitration panel ultimately awarded the couple more than USD 777,000 in damages along with attorney fees and costs of arbitration.
In challenging the award, Mid Atlantic claimed that the panel had accidentally awarded the couple a double recovery instead of only awarding one of the alternative measures of damages offered by the couple’s damages expert. In response, the couple asked the district court to confirm the arbitration award, arguing that the court only had the authority to modify the award if the mistake was evident “on the face of the award,” and that the error alleged by Mid Atlantic required the court to delve into the arbitration record.
The court applied a “face-of-the-award limitation” because it preserved the parties’ bargain for an arbitrator, rather than a court, to resolve their dispute. It would prevent courts from substituting their judgment for that of the arbitrator when going beyond the award’s face in search of obvious, material mathematical errors. It would also ensure that arbitration remains an efficient means for resolving disputes rather than a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.
B.7 Second Circuit affirms district court decision that, in determining whether there is diversity jurisdiction in connection with a subpoena request under the FAA, one looks to the citizenship of the parties to the subpoena dispute, not of the parties to the underlying arbitration.
In an arbitration to which the petitioner-Appellee Washington National Insurance Company (WNIC) was a party, the arbitration panel summoned the Respondents-Appellants OBEX Group LLC and Randall Katzenstein to testify at a hearing and to bring with them specified documents. The respondents did not appear. WNIC, invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction, then petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to enforce the summonses under section 7 of the FAA.
The Second Circuit noted the “anomalous” nature of the FAA in that it bestows no federal jurisdiction, but requires a party to establish an independent jurisdictional basis. In this case, that basis was diversity jurisdiction. Respondents argued that the court must “look through” the FAA petition to the underlying arbitration and determine diversity based on the citizenship of the parties to the arbitration. The Second Circuit disagreed. It said that, in evaluating whether the requirement of complete diversity is satisfied, a court assessing its jurisdiction over an FAA petition is to “look only to the citizenship of the parties in the action before it”—that is, the “parties to the petition to compel” and not the parties to the arbitration. Here, those parties satisfied the test for diversity.
The respondents also argued that, even if the parties were diverse, the court still lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the value of “obtaining Appellants’ testimony and documents” did not exceed the jurisdictional threshold of USD 75,000. The court disagreed and explained that, in actions for declaratory or injunctive relief, which are equitable in nature, the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation. WNIC sought USD 134 million in the arbitration and the documents responsive to the summonses that were the subject of this section 7 petition were relevant to whether WNIC was entitled to all or part of that amount. The court said that even if the documents required by the summonses “pertain to only a small fraction of [the award sought], the amount in controversy requirement would be satisfied.”
The respondents also argued that the subpoenas were unduly burdensome, overbroad, duplicative of prior arbitration summonses, and required disclosure of privileged or protected matter. The district court had declined to rule on those objections, stating that, regardless of whether it had the power to do so, it did not have any such obligation. It noted too that courts in the Second Circuit generally defer those issues to the arbitrators.
The Second Circuit rejected the argument that the district court was obliged to rule on the objections. The court explained that section 7 of the FAA indicates that summonses are to be enforced in “the same manner” that a subpoena is to be enforced—i.e., by compulsion or contempt. Rule 45 does not, however, cover these processes. Instead, it covers subpoenas generally—what they contain, how they are served, where they can require a person to go, and how a person must respond, among other things. The respondents’ interpretation also did not square with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration in that it would involve the district court in great detail in the arbitration. Without deciding whether district courts have the power to rule on such objections, the Second Circuit decided that, under section 7 of the FAA, the district court was not obliged to consider objections based on Rule 45.
The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s decision to reject the jurisdictional argument and the motion to quash the subpoena.
B.8 Sixth Circuit holds that incorporation of the AAA Rules into an arbitration agreement is “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties had agreed to allow an arbitrator to decide whether a non-signatory franchisor could enforce the agreement.
The plaintiff, Derek Piersing (“Piersing“) was an employee in the state of Washington for the defendant, Domino’s Pizza (“Domino’s“). Piersing accepted employment at a second Domino’s location and signed an arbitration agreement that specified that “all issues related to employment would be arbitrated and conducted according to the American Arbitration Association National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes” (“AAA Rules“). Piersing was fired from his first employer and resigned from the second job for medical reasons.
Piersing and another individual filed a class action that alleged that Domino’s franchise agreement, which required its franchises to neither solicit nor hire employees from other franchises without consent from the prior employer, violated federal antitrust and state law. Domino’s moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA. Piersing opposed the motion and argued that Domino’s could not enforce the arbitration agreement because Domino’s did not sign the employment agreements; the individual franchises signed the agreements. The district court ordered Piersing to arbitration anyway, finding that Piersing had agreed to arbitrate not only the merits of certain claims, but also threshold questions about the agreements themselves.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered whether an arbitrator or judge should resolve the subject of “arbitrability.” The court explained that the parties can delegate such questions to an arbitrator, but only if there is “clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties agreed to do so. Here, Piersing agreed that the American Arbitration Association (AAA) would administer the arbitration and have their rules apply. Those rules provide the arbitrator with the “power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.” The Sixth Circuit held that the incorporation of the AAA Rules into the parties’ arbitration agreement was “clear and unmistakable evidence” that Piersing had agreed to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability.
Piersing claimed that the relevant AAA rule—that “the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement”—addressed the arbitration agreement’s scope, not whether a non-signatory could enforce the agreement. The court explained that the use of the term “including” showed that “scope, existence, and validity” were meant to illustrate rather than exhaust the concept of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. The question of whether Domino’s could enforce the agreement against Piersing, a signatory thereto, was thus a question of arbitrability that Piersing had assigned to the arbitrator by incorporation of the AAA Rules.
Piersing also argued that a ruling in support of Domino’s would mean that anyone could force him to arbitrate “arbitrability,” no matter how frivolous the argument for arbitration. The court pointed out that the Supreme Court had recently rejected a nearly identical argument about “frivolous motions to compel arbitration.” The Supreme Court explained that—whatever the merits of this policy concern—it could not rewrite the text of the FAA to accommodate this concern. It also found the concern overstated: arbitrators can quickly resolve frivolous motions and in some cases even impose sanctions for such motions.
In rejecting Piersing’s arguments, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the question it was deciding was a narrow one. It was not a question about the merits of the case, or even whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits. It was simply about who should decide whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits. Here, that person was the arbitrator.
In January 2021, the Supreme Court took action in two cases in which it signaled that it is not going to weigh in on the issue of whether an arbitration clause incorporating rules like those of the AAA that provide for arbitrators to decide arbitrability constitutes “clear and unmistakable evidence” of parties’ intent that the arbitrators decide arbitrability, leaving in place the decisions of the many circuit courts that so hold.
 2019 Ill. S.B. 75; available at, https://ogletree.com/insights/the-who-what-and-when-on-illinois-employment-agreements-under-the-workplace-transparency-act/.
 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21850, 2020 WL 605877.
 NY CLS CPLR § 7515 (“Mandatory arbitration clauses; prohibited.”)
 Newton v LMVH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton Inc., 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3288, 2020 NY Slip Op 32290(U); https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-york-state-judge-allows-sexual-harassment-claim-to-proceed-court-invalidating.
 https://www.jamsadr.com/news/2020/coronavirus-(covid-19)-advisory-for-jams-visitors (JAMS advisory update informing clients that its offices in most cities have shifted to virtual sessions only); https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/alternative-dispute-resolution/articles/2020/spring2020-utilizing-virtual-arbitration-during-the-pandemic/ (discussing various issues to be wary of during virtual arbitration hearings).
 No. 18-1048 (U.S. June 1, 2020).
 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999).
 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999).
 See El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica Del Rio Lempa, 341 Fed. Appx. 31, 33-34 (5th Cir. 2009).
 939 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2019).
 No. 18-2454 (4th Cir. Mar. 30, 2020).
 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 30333 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 2020).
 Trajkovski Invest AB v. I.Am.Plus Electronics, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00152-ODW (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2020)
 Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., No. A-66-18 (N.J. Sept. 11, 2020)
 Dohrmann v. Intuit, Inc., No. 20-15466 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2020).
 Mid Atlantic Corp. v. Bien, Nos. 18-1195 and 18-1200 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2020).
 Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. OBEX Group LLC, No. 19-225-cv (2d Cir. May 1, 2020).
 Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza, No. 19-2388 (6th Cir. June 17, 2020).