Search for:


A.1       Legislation

The United States is a federal jurisdiction that has arbitration-related legislation at both the federal (national) and state levels. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925 continues to be the controlling federal arbitration statute and reflects a well-established national policy that strongly favors arbitration as an alternate means of dispute resolution. In its almost 100-year history, the FAA had not seen any major amendments.[1] However, such an amendment occurred on 3 March 2022, when President Biden signed the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFASASHA).[2]

EFASASHA invalidates pre-dispute arbitration agreements and joint-action waivers in cases that relate to sexual assault or sexual harassment, at the election of the party alleging sexual misconduct, and applies to any sexual assault or sexual harassment dispute that arises or accrues on or after 3 March 2022.[3] However, EFASASHA only applies to pre-dispute agreements and waivers, so any agreement to arbitrate a sexual assault or sexual harassment dispute after a claim arises can still be enforced, subject to applicable state law. Any issue as to whether the EFASASHA applies to a dispute will be determined by a court under federal law, irrespective of any agreement to delegate such determinations to an arbitrator.[4]

In effect, EFASASHA preserves an employee’s right to sue their employer in court for sexual assault or sexual harassment notwithstanding a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. EFASASHA, which earned bipartisan support, culminates lawmakers’ efforts over the years to curtail or ban mandatory arbitration in federal workplace harassment cases. State legislatures in California, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and Washington have also passed statutes limiting employers’ ability to require arbitration of sexual harassment and (depending on the state) other claims. However, such state statutes have typically been preempted by the FAA in the past.[5] This trend may begin to change with EFASASHA now in effect.

US Congress also introduced and voted on other arbitration-related bills in 2022. For example, on 17 March 2022, just two weeks after EFASASHA was signed into law, the US House of Representatives voted in favor (by a slight majority: 222-209) of the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act.[6] The FAIR Act, if signed into law, would ban mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in cases of employment, consumer, antitrust class actions, and civil rights disputes, as well as pre-dispute joint/class action waivers for those disputes in any forum. Accordingly, the FAIR Act would expand EFASASHA, which only applies to sexual assault or sexual harassment cases. However, the FAIR Act faces an uphill battle before becoming law — while EFASASHA passed the House with a 335-97 vote and noted bipartisan support,[7] the FAIR Act vote was much narrower.

Additionally, the Mental Health Matters Act, which was introduced in the House of Representatives on 16 May 2022, narrowly passed with a 220-205 vote on 9 September 2022. If signed into law, the Mental Health Matters Act would, among other provisions, prohibit arbitration clauses in benefit plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.[8]

A.2       Institutions, rules and infrastructure

The major arbitral institutions in the US include JAMS, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), which is the international division of the AAA.

In 2022, the AAA, headquartered in New York, made significant amendments to its primary set of rules for commercial disputes — the AAA Commercial Rules and Mediation Procedures, which became effective on 1 September 2022. No changes were made to the ICDR Rules. The AAA changes include[9]:

  • Rule R-1(b) and (c): The revised rule increases the upper limit for the application of the Expedited Procedures from USD 75,000 to USD 100,000. Similarly, revised Rule R-1(c) now applies to cases where any claim is at least USD 1 million, increased from USD 500,000.
  • Rule R-2(d): The revised rule identifies and outlines the Administrative Review Council as the decision-making authority for certain administrative issues pursuant to the Large, Complex Case Procedures.
  • Rule R-8: The new rule allows a party to file a request to consolidate two or more existing arbitrations into a single proceeding or to request the joinder of additional parties to an ongoing arbitration.
  • Rules R-22, R-25, R-33 and Expedited Procedure E-7: These revised rules allow for more efficient meetings through technology (e.g., includes the use of video conference as a method of conducting the preliminary hearing).
  • Rule R-34: The revised rule requires the arbitrator to consider time and cost associated with the briefing of a dispositive motion.
  • Rule R-39: The revised rule excludes cases administered pursuant to the Expedited Procedures. The new Rule R-39(i) further allows the emergency arbitrator to consider whether the request for emergency relief was made in good faith when deciding cost allocation.
  • Rule R-45: The new rule codifies existing obligations of AAA staff and arbitrators to keep confidential all matters relating to an arbitration or an award.
  • Rule R-48: The revised rule allows an arbitrator to electronically sign an award, subject to exceptions.
  • Rule R-52: The revised rule allows an arbitrator to interpret reasoned awards upon a party’s request, as well as modify awards for errors.
  • Preliminary Hearing Procedure P-2(vi): The revised Checklist recommends that the arbitrator and parties discuss cybersecurity, privacy, and data protection during every preliminary hearing.
  • Preliminary Hearing Procedure P-2(xii): The revised Checklist includes as a potential topic for preliminary hearings the existence and identity of sources of third-party funding.
  • Expedited Procedure E-5: The revised rule prohibits certain discoveries and motions in the interest of efficiency and cost, especially in cases with smaller claim amounts.
  • Procedures L-2: The revised rule increases the minimum claim/counterclaim amount to at least USD 3 million from USD 1 million.

JAMS is headquartered in Irvine, California, but maintains offices in 27 locations throughout North America and the United Kingdom; it did not update its rules in 2022.

CPR, headquartered in New York, did not change its rules, but announced that all references to The International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Inc. or CPR in the CPR Rules, Procedures, Protocols, Model Procedural Orders, Model Clauses and Guidelines will be deemed to be a reference to “CPR Dispute Resolution Services LLC,” effective 1 July 2022.[10]

B.         CASES

B.1       Supreme Court holds that section 1782 may not be used in aid of international arbitration [11]

Section 1782 (28 USC § 1782) authorizes a federal district court to order the production of documents, as well as depositions of witnesses, in aid of foreign proceedings. There are three statutory requirements under section 1782, as follows:

  • The request for discovery is made “by a foreign or international tribunal” or “any interested person”
  • The discovery requested is “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal”
  • The person from whom the discovery is sought resides, or is found, in the district of the district court where the request has been made

If these statutory requirements are met, the district court may — although it is not required to — exercise its discretion and grant the petition.  The Supreme Court’s only prior treatment of section 1782, in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), identified four non-exclusive factors a district court should consider in exercising its discretion and, ever since, it has been essentially de rigueur for every section 1782 decision to discuss those factors.

The majority opinion in Intel also included a quote from an article written by the late Professor Hans Smit, the primary draftsperson of the current version of section 1782, in which he wrote “[t]he term ‘tribunal’ … includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative courts.” The reference in this quotation to “arbitration” resulted in 18 years of section 1782 cases being brought in aid of arbitration and, ultimately, to a split in the district courts and then the Circuit Courts on the issue of whether section 1782 could be used in aid of private, international arbitration.

The Supreme Court decisions in ZF Automotive and AlixPartners resolved that split. The Supreme Court’s analysis was very much textual. The key statutory language is “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” The Supreme Court explained that the definition of the word “tribunal” did not really help answer the question. It can be used as a synonym for “court,” in which case it carries a distinctively governmental flavor. But it can also be used more broadly to refer to any adjudicatory body. Statutory history indicated that Congress used “tribunal” in the broader sense because the 1964 changes to the statute expanded the provision to cover proceedings in a “foreign or international tribunal” and not just “courts.” And, in Intel, the Supreme Court observed, that shift created the possibility of US judicial assistance in connection with administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings abroad. The Supreme Court said that if it had nothing but this single word to go on, there would be a good case for including private arbitral panels within the ambit of section 1782.

But that word did not stand alone and, therefore, the Supreme Court went on to analyze the meaning of the word “tribunal” as part of the phrases “foreign tribunal” and “international tribunal.” With respect to a “foreign tribunal,” the Supreme Court referred to the amicus brief of the US, which said, “The phrase ‘foreign leader’ brings to mind ‘an official of a foreign state, not a team captain of a European football club.’”[12] “Foreign tribunal” was similar. Turning next to the meaning of “international tribunal,” the Supreme Court said “international” can mean either (i) involving or of two or more “nations,” or (ii) involving or of two or more “nationalities.” The latter definition did not seem right for section 1782 because it would be strange if the availability of discovery turned on the national origin of the adjudicators. Thus, the Supreme Court said, a tribunal is “international” when it involves or is of two or more nations, meaning that those nations have imbued the tribunal with official power to adjudicate disputes.

The Supreme Court also found support for its position in looking at discovery under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 USC §1 et seq., which governs domestic arbitration. Under the FAA, only the arbitration panel can request discovery, but a party to the foreign arbitration may do so under section 1782. Also, pre-arbitration discovery is not permitted under the FAA, while, under section 1782, discovery may be sought for a case that is “within reasonable contemplation.” Interpreting section 1782 to reach private arbitration would therefore create a notable mismatch between foreign and domestic arbitration. Quoting from the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court observed, “[i]t’s hard to conjure a rationale for giving parties to private foreign arbitrations such broad access to federal court discovery assistance in the United States while precluding such discovery assistance for litigants in domestic arbitrations.” The court said also that the statute’s history supported its interpretation.

But one door was not completely closed. There has already been litigation over whether these decisions apply to investor-state arbitrations. A split in the lower courts on that issue might mean that it does not get resolved until another trip to the Supreme Court.

B.2       Supreme Court holds that courts may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice[13] 

Petitioner Robyn Morgan (“Morgan”) worked as an hourly employee at a Taco Bell franchise owned by respondent Sundance, Inc. (“Sundance”). When applying for the job, she signed an agreement to “use confidential binding arbitration, instead of going to court,” to resolve any employment disputes. Despite that agreement, Morgan brought a nationwide collective action against Sundance in federal court for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Sundance initially defended itself against Morgan’s suit as if no arbitration agreement existed, and even filed a motion to dismiss, answered Morgan’s complaint, and asserted 14 affirmative defenses. After nearly eight months of litigation, Sundance moved to stay the lawsuit and compel arbitration. Morgan opposed the motion, arguing that Sundance had waived its right to arbitrate by litigating for so long.

The district court applied Eighth Circuit precedent, under which a party waives its contractual right to arbitration if it knew of the right, acted inconsistently with that right, and prejudiced the other party by its inconsistent actions. The prejudice requirement is not, however, a feature of federal waiver law generally. It was adopted in the arbitration context, and was based on the federal policy favoring arbitration embodied in the FAA. Ultimately, the district court found that the prejudice requirement was satisfied and that Sundance had waived its right to arbitration. The Eighth Circuit disagreed—reasoning that the parties had not yet begun formal discovery or contested any matters “going to the merits”—and sent Morgan’s case to arbitration. In a dissenting opinion, one of the judges on the panel raised doubts about the Eighth Circuit’s prejudice requirement, observing that, outside the arbitration context, prejudice is not needed for a waiver and noting that “some circuits allow a finding of waiver of arbitration without a showing of prejudice.” The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve that circuit split.

In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court pointed out that the prejudice requirement is not a feature of federal waiver law generally and that a federal court assessing waiver does not generally ask about prejudice. In fact, to decide whether a waiver has occurred, a court generally focuses on the actions of the person who held the right and seldom considers the effects of those actions on the opposing party. The Supreme Court further reasoned that the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration” did not authorize federal courts to invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural rules. Instead, the “policy favoring arbitration” was merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts. In short, the Supreme Court found that it was improper for a court to devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation. As a result, the court vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings.

B.3       Second Circuit affirms decision to award comity to a foreign judgment that set aside an award in part[14]

Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited (“Esso”), a Nigerian subsidiary to an international oil corporation, entered into an agreement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to produce oil at a Nigeria-governed oil field. Under the agreement, Esso was permitted to extract oil for profit from the oil field, provided that NNPC would obtain portions of the extracted oil in order to fulfil Esso’s tax and royalty obligations to the Nigerian government, while also maintaining its own share of the operation’s profits.

Esso commenced an arbitration proceeding against NNPC upon its determination that NNPC had taken more oil than it was permitted to take under the terms of the agreement. The arbitral panel originally awarded Esso approximately USD 1.8 billion, plus interest. However, NNPC challenged the award in the Nigerian courts, resulting in two separate judgements in which the Nigerian Court of Appeals set aside part of the award based on the determination that it involved a non-arbitrable tax dispute.

Subsequently, while multiple appeals were pending in the Nigerian courts, Esso brought a petition in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, under the New York Convention, to enforce the entire award against NNCP. The district court refused to enforce the award and extended comity to the Nigerian judgements. Esso appealed.

The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to enforce the arbitral award and its decision to extend comity to the judgements made by the Nigerian Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit explained that a district court should enforce an award that was set aside in its primary jurisdiction — and thereby deny comity to the relevant foreign judgment — only if the judgment setting aside the award can be properly characterized as “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just.” Esso had not met that standard. Esso had an opportunity to be heard, there was no retroactive application of laws enacted after the dispute arose, and the judgments were not so facially deficient in their substantive analysis that they merited no respect. The district court accordingly properly afforded comity to the Nigerian Court of Appeal judgments.

B.4       On remand from the Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit affirms district court decision that non-signatories may enforce arbitration clauses under the New York Convention[15]

In 2007, the predecessor of Plaintiff Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC (“Outokumpu”) entered into a series of agreements with F.L. Industries Inc. (“Fives”) for the provision of three cold rolling mills used for manufacturing and processing steel products. The parties agreed that disputes arising from the agreements would be subject to arbitration under German law. Fives subsequently entered into a subcontracting agreement with Defendant Coverteam SAS, (“Coverteam”), to install motors at each of the mills. By August 2015, the motors in all three mills failed. Outokumpu filed a lawsuit against Coverteam in Alabama state court. Coverteam removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss and to compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause in the agreements covering “[a]ll disputes arising between both parties in connection with or in the performance of the Contract.” The agreements defined Outokumpu as the “Buyer” and Fives as the “Seller,” but provided that “[w]hen Seller is mentioned it shall be understood as Sub-contractors included, except if expressly stated otherwise.” Coverteam was on the subcontractor list for each contract.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that under the New York Convention, Coverteam could not compel arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, because the plain language of Article II of the Convention stated that arbitration could be compelled only where the parties agreed in writing, Coverteam, as a non-signatory, would not be able to compel arbitration.

The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, holding that the New York Convention was “simply silent on the issue of non-signatory enforcement.” According to the Supreme Court, the provisions in Article II “address the recognition of arbitration agreements, not who is bound by a recognized agreement.” Here, the three agreements were both written and signed, satisfying Article II. The Supreme Court accordingly remanded to the Eleventh Circuit to answer the question of whether Coverteam could enforce the arbitration clauses under principles of equitable estoppel.

After reviewing supplemental briefings from the parties, the Eleventh Circuit found in favor of Coverteam. The Eleventh Circuit explained that, although Coverteam was not a signatory to the agreements, Coverteam was a defined party covered by the arbitration clause. Because “Seller” was understood to include Fives and subcontractors, Outokumpu had thereby agreed to arbitrate disputes that arose with Fives and subcontractors. Based on that conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit determined that it did not need to come to a decision on the equitable estoppel arguments.

B.5       Fourth Circuit holds that a party does not need to satisfy the requirement for a written agreement imposed by the New York Convention in order to invoke the court’s subject matter jurisdiction[16]

Rachan Reddy (“Reddy”) and Rashid Buttar (“Buttar”) entered into an agreement, dated 21 June 2010, involving the sale of real property in the Philippines. Under the agreement, Buttar agreed to sell Reddy shares in a company that indirectly owned Dumanpalit Island in the Philippines. Reddy paid multiple advances to Buttar before learning that a local indigenous tribe claimed ownership over the island. Reddy demanded a refund, but Buttar demanded the remaining amount due under the agreement (plus interest, penalty fees, and reimbursement costs) totaling approximately USD 2 million.

Reddy commenced arbitration in Singapore under the 2010 agreement. Buttar objected to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and made two arguments: (i) that Buttar had not signed the agreement; and (ii) even if he had signed the agreement, it was merely a “working draft” and did not constitute the latest version. Buttar was given notice of the hearing but did not attend. The arbitrator held that both Buttar and Reddy signed the agreement and functioned under it until the dispute arose. The arbitrator ordered Buttar to pay Reddy USD 1.55 million plus interest, legal fees, and arbitration costs. Reddy sought to enforce the award in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina under the New York Convention.

Buttar moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing, among other things, that there was “no executed contract or agreement.” The district court rejected Buttar’s arguments and held in favor of Reddy. The district court reasoned that 9 USC § 203 expressly provided for jurisdiction over cases “falling under the Convention.” The court noted that Buttar’s argument that he and Reddy had not signed an executed contract went to the “merits of the case,” not subject matter jurisdiction.

On appeal, Buttar once again argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Buttar alleged that the Convention imposed a number of requirements, which he believed were “conditions for jurisdiction.” These conditions included that the agreement be in writing and signed by the parties. He argued that, because he “neither executed the contract in question nor consented to arbitration,” the conditions for subject matter jurisdiction were not met.

The Fourth Circuit rejected Buttar’s argument and held that the Convention’s conditions are merits questions that relate to whether an award is enforceable under the Convention and not jurisdictional questions. The Fourth Circuit accordingly disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit decision in Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, which held that the Convention’s “mandatory language in establishing the prerequisites” for enforcement of an award meant that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when a party failed to satisfy those prerequisites. Rather than aligning with the Eleventh Circuit in Czarina, the Fourth Circuit joined the Second and Ninth Circuits in holding that the Convention’s prerequisites “raise merits questions,” the validity of which “is something to be litigated and determined.” More specifically, the Convention’s prerequisites do “not go to the power of the court to make the determination.” The court noted that Czarina “blurs the distinction between jurisdictional and merits requirements.”

B.6       District court recognizes and confirms a partial final arbitration award against a foreign sovereign and foreign government agency, rejecting arguments that the arbitration provision was illegal under foreign law, that the notice of arbitration was defective, and that the arbitration violated due process because it was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic[17]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.7.      District court orders party to withdraw actions in foreign country where the parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes and to delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrators[18]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.8       Appellate court holds that state law cannot strip federal courts of federal jurisdiction granted by the FAA and that the FAA’s arbitral award standards for review govern where the parties did not explicitly choose state law review standards[19]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.9       District court denies a bankrupt internet provider’s bid to enforce a USD 16 million arbitration award against the Indonesian government because it was untimely[20]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.10     District court confirms and enforces two arbitral awards against a party that neither personally signed an arbitration agreement nor directly involved itself in the arbitration proceedings[21]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.11     District court confirms a foreign arbitral award and declines to stay enforcement despite a pending annulment action in the country with primary jurisdiction over the award[22]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.12     District court confirms arbitral award despite arbitrator decision to deny discovery and evidentiary hearing[23]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.13     Second Circuit holds that a court has discretion to weigh extraordinary circumstances in deciding the amount of the attachment in aid of arbitration, even where the statutory requirements for attachment are satisfied[24]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.14      Party waived right to object to two of its attorneys withdrawing and joining the opposing party’s law firm during arbitral proceedings when it failed to raise the issue until the party received an adverse award more than a year after it became aware that the attorneys switched sides[25]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.15     Ninth Circuit holds that federal district courts have original jurisdiction over actions or proceedings relating to arbitration agreements or awards which fall under the New York Convention[26]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.16     Second Circuit affirms district court’s finding of personal jurisdiction over an instrumentality of a foreign state, holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not require service of a summons in a proceeding to confirm a foreign arbitral award[27]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.17     Second Circuit affirms order denying motion to compel arbitration, holding that there was not clear and unmistakable evidence in the parties’ contract of an intent to arbitrate arbitrability and that the appellant’s claims were not subject to arbitration[28]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.18     First Circuit affirms district court decision that three-year statute of limitations for confirmation of multiple interim damages awards did not start to run until the final award was issued[29]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.19     District court holds strict adherence to service rules necessary to render default judgment in petition to confirm arbitration award[30]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.20.    Second Circuit holds that an ambiguous arbitration clause cannot be read to render the clause entirely superfluous, and that parties can waive right to statutory prejudgment interest on an arbitration award[31]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.21     District court holds that a tribunal in an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes arbitration is not “a foreign or international tribunal” under 28 USC § 1782 and, therefore discovery may not be sought in aid of such an arbitration[32]

Click here for a summary of this case.

B.22     Third Circuit holds that district court improperly dismissed a petition to enforce a foreign arbitration award where correspondence between the parties could be understood as an agreement to arbitrate under the New York Convention[33]

Click here for a summary of this case.




[4] Id.

[5] See e.g., New Jersey Civ. Just. Inst. v. Grewal, No. CV 19-17518, 2020 WL 4188129 (D.N.J. July 21, 2020).See also




[9] A full list of changes is available on the AAA’s website, at:


[11] ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshares Ltd., No. 21–401 __ U.S. __(June 13, 2022); AlixPartners, LLP, et al. v. Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign States, No. 21–518 __ U.S. __(June 13, 2022)


[13] Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. ____ (2022). 

[14] Esso Expl. and Prod. Nigeria Ltd. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 40 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2022).

[15] Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, v. Coverteam SAS, No. 17-10944 (11th Cir. July 8, 2022).

[16] Reddy v. Buttar, 38 F.4th 393 (4th Cir. 2022)

[17] Preble-Rish Haiti, S.A. v. Republic of Haiti, No. 21-cv-6704 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022).

[18] Citigroup Inc. v. Sayeg, No. 21-cv-10413 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2022).

[19] Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Oceltip Aviation 1 Pty Ltd, No. 20-11080, 31 F. 4th 1323 (11th Cir. 2022)

[20] PT Rahajasa Media Internet v. Telecomm. & Informatics Fin. Provider and Mgmt. Ctr., No. 20 Civ. 11035, 2022 US Dist. LEXIS 61723 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022)

[21] Generali España de Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. Speedier Shipping, Inc., No. 21-CV-4080 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2022).

[22] Iraq Telecom Ltd. v. IBL Bank S.A.L., No. 21cv10940, 2022 US Dist. LEXIS 65729 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2022).

[23] 245 Park Member LLC v. HNA Grp. (Int’l) Co., 1:22-cv-5136-JGK (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2022).

[24] Iraq Telecom Ltd. v. IBL Bank S.A.L.,43 F.4th 263 (2d Cir. 2022).

[25] Técnicas Reunidas de Talara S.A.C. v. SSK Ingenieria y Construccion S.A.C., 40 F.4th 1339 (11th Cir. 2022)

[26] Jones Day v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, 42 F.4th 1131 (9th Cir. 2022).

[27] Commodities & Minerals Enter. Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A., 49 F.4th 8-2 (2d Cir. 2022).

[28] Lavvan, Inc. v. Amyris, Inc., No. 21-1819 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2022).

[29] University of Notre Dame v. TJAC Waterloo, LLC, No. 21-1558 (1st Cir. Sept. 13, 2022).

[30] Republic of Guatemala v. IC Power Asia Dev. Ltd., No. 22-CV-00394(CM) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2022).

[31] ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 163 (2d Cir. 2022).

[32] In re Application of Alpene, Ltd., No. 21 MC 2547 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2022).

[33] Jiangsu Beier Decoration Materials Co. v. Angle World LLC, 52 F.4th 554 (3d Cir. 2022).


David Zaslowsky has been practicing international litigation and international arbitration for almost 40 years. He has been Chambers-ranked in international arbitration and also sits as an arbitrator. He specializes in technology cases and is the editor of the Firm's Blockchain Blog and its International Litigation & Arbitration Newsletter.


Thomas Tysowsky is a member of the North America Litigation & Government Enforcement Practice Group in Baker McKenzie's Los Angeles office. He joined the Firm in 2019 upon graduating from Vanderbilt Law School, where his studies focused on complex litigation. Today Tom focuses his practice on class actions, state and federal commercial litigation, and arbitration. He has defended class actions for a range of clients during his time at the Firm’s Los Angeles, San Francisco and Houston offices. He has represented domestic and multinational corporations involved in nearly all aspects of litigation and advises clients in all litigation phases. Tom’s diverse experiences provide him with background knowledge that he brings to the benefit of his clients.


Richard Yang is an associate in Baker McKenzie San Francisco office.


Michelle Shin is an associate in the International Commercial Group and is based in our San Francisco office. She advises US and multinational companies on data privacy compliance, intellectual property, and consumer protection laws. Michelle's practice involves global data privacy law compliance, which includes the GDPR, CCPA, CAADCA, and HIPAA. She also helps clients comply with consumer protection laws, such as those that apply to sweepstakes, advertising, and marketing.