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The consequences of the Decree No. 34 of 2021 (“Decree”) (abolishing inter alia the DIFC-LCIA arbitration center, see our previous alerts here and here) came to the attention of the courts once again in decisions issued by the Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance, Commercial Division, in case no. 1046/2023 and the Abu Dhabi Court of Appeal in case no. 449/2024 (the “Courts”) (“Decisions”). In these unsurprising but important Decisions the Courts confirmed the validity and binding nature of arbitration agreements referring to the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Arbitration Institute (“DIFC-LCIA”).

Factual Background

As previously reported, in September 2021, the joint venture between the Dubai International Financial Centre and the London Court of International Arbitration (DIFC-LCIA), and the Emirates Maritime Arbitration Centre were abolished, and all the respective assets, liabilities, rights, and obligations of these institutions were transferred to the newly established Dubai International Arbitration Center (DIAC) by way of the Decree No. 34. The consequences of the Decree for the arbitration agreements in favour of the DIFC-LCIA has attracted attention on various occasions since then.

Specifically, in November 2023, in Baker Hughes Saudi Arabia Co. Ltd. v. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia, Ltd., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana refused to compel a claimant to DIAC arbitration when the arbitration agreement provided for DIFC-LCIA arbitration. The court explained that relevant precedent dictated that arbitration could not be compelled when the agreed arbitral institution is unavailable or no longer in existence (see here). The decision attracted a lot of attention as it crystallized the risk for the parties who still have DIFC-LCIA arbitration clauses in their agreement (which was very common in the Middle East region before the Decree).

Earlier this year, the Singapore High Court also dealt with this issue ([2024] SGHC 71). Although the Singapore High Court rejected the appeal against the order granting permission to enforce a provisional award issued in an arbitration under DIAC Rules, it did so on the basis that the respondent had demonstrated an unequivocal, clear and consistent intention to submit to the tribunal’s jurisdiction with respect to the Application (by not challenging the jurisdiction in respect of the Application on the basis of the Decree). At the same time, it concluded that agreements on institutional rules “concern the basic architecture of the arbitration and typically have a substantial impact on the arbitral proceedings”, so “it was a stretch to say that the parties intended, at the time they signed the Settlement Agreement, to accept arbitration administered by any institute in Dubai (whether then existing or not) regardless of the rules under which the arbitration would be conducted.” On this basis, the Singapore High Court found that the DIFC-LCIA arbitration clause may not apply.

Against this context, the Decisions shed light on the approach of UAE courts to the same matter.

The Circumstances of the Case

The dispute in question arose from a contract for the supply of medical equipment providing for  DIFC-LCIA arbitration with the seat in the DIFC. The claimant commenced litigation in the Abu Dhabi courts despite the arbitration agreement. The respondent disputed jurisdiction of the Courts with reference to the DIFC-LCIA arbitration clause The claimant – among other things – argued that the arbitration clause is incapable of being performed because the Decree abolished the DIFC-LCIA.

The Courts agreed with the respondent and dismissed the claim.

Rationale of the Courts

In the Decisions, the Courts concluded that:

  1. The abolishment of the arbitral institution by itself does not make the arbitration agreement incapable of being performed. It relied on the travaux préparatoires to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) in this respect.
  2. The absence of one of the elements of the intent to arbitrate (the abolishment of the arbitral institution) does not necessarily invalidate the intent of the parties to arbitrate, as long as there is an explicit agreement to arbitrate.

Notably, in reaching these conclusions, the Courts analyzed specifically the Baker Hughes Saudi Arabia Co. Ltd. v. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia, Ltd. Case, as well as cases from other jurisdictions on similar matters. The Courts decided that they preferred the approach of other courts, such as that of the Paris Court of Appeal in Case No. 10/23578. In the case decided by the Paris Court of Appeal, the court analyzed a clause referring to the rules of the German Arbitration Commission (DAS), which was merged with the German Arbitration Institute (DIS) to form the current DIS in 1992. The court in that case concluded that the validity of the arbitration clause was not affected, as DIS was the successor of DAS.

The Courts concluded that they did not compel the parties to arbitration in a specific institution, such as DIAC, but rather enforced the “negative effect” of the arbitration agreement, i.e., that the parties cannot resort to state courts instead. They stated that the parties may agree to another arbitral institution should they wish to do so.

DIFC Court’s analysis of the Decisions

The DIFC Court of First Instance (“DIFC Court”) had recently to consider the same issue in ARB 009/2024 Narciso v Nash. The DIFC Court was faced with an application for an anti-suit injunction in a case where the arbitration agreement again provided for DIFC-LCIA arbitration. One of the arguments advanced by the defendant was that it could not be forced to arbitration in the forum that it did not choose, with reference to Baker Hughes Saudi Arabia Co. Ltd. v. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia, Ltd.

The DIFC Court analyzed the matter under DIFC law and concluded that it was bound by the Decree. Furthermore, it analyzed the Decisions and concluded that, even if it had not been bound by the Decree, the DIFC Court would have adopted the reasoning of the Decisions. Notably, in summarizing the Decisions, the DIFC Court stated:

“4) Decree 34 preserves the parties’ bargain and if the parties had not wished their arbitration after the Effective Date of the Decree to have been administered by DIAC according to its Rules, it was open to the parties to have agreed that another institution was appointed in its place. I would add that if these parties had been genuinely concerned about the differences between the DIFC-LCIA and DIAC Rules they could have agreed to the rules of the LCIA itself which were materially identical the DIFC-LCIA Rules;”

The DIFC Court’s interpretation of the Decisions considered that it is not only the “negative effect” of the arbitration agreement that it preserved, but also the “positive” one – the Decree supplements the arbitration agreement, and if the parties do not wish for DIAC to administer the arbitration, they should specifically agree so.

Practical effect of the Decisions

The Decisions clarify the position of UAE Courts in respect of the effect of the Decree and confirm that the UAE courts would treat the LCIA-DIFC arbitration agreements as binding, valid and capable of being performed.

Although the Decisions do not confirm that the arbitration in such cases should be conducted under the DIAC Arbitration Rules as provided by the Decree, further conclusions of DIFC Court suggest that the positive effect of the LCIA-DIFC arbitration agreements will be similarly respected.

However, the Decisions do not exclude the risk of different approaches in foreign courts, which may decide otherwise when faced with claims covered by such arbitration agreements – especially when a party entertains an objection to DIAC tribunal’s jurisdiction on the basis of the Decree, thus not submitting to the jurisdiction of the DIAC tribunal irrespective of the DIFC-LCIA arbitration agreement.

As such, it remains advisable to align the “old” arbitration agreements with the Decree and expressly agree to DIAC (or another) arbitration to avoid jurisdictional disputes, enforcement issues, as well as claims submitted to state courts outside of the UAE. The risk is especially high if enforcement outside of the UAE may be contemplated.

Author

Luka Kristovic-Blazevic heads Baker McKenzie's Middle East International Arbitration Practice based in Dubai. He specializes in international commercial arbitration, with a particular focus on complex international construction disputes. In 2019 and 2020, Luka was recognized by Who’s Who Legal as a "Future Leader – Arbitration” in Saudi Arabia and was cited as “especially notable for construction-related international arbitration” by Chambers Global (Saudi Arabia). Luka is a guest lecturer at Prince Sultan University in Riyadh, where he lectures on dispute resolution and construction law, and also acts as arbitrator.

Author

Taisiya Vorotilova is a senior associate in Baker McKenzie's Dubai office. She assists clients in commercial disputes as well as in complex multijurisdictional disputes involving arbitration, litigation and bankruptcy.

Author

Marlize Dumas is an associate in Baker McKenzie's Dubai office. She specializes in international arbitration and her practice focuses on the resolution of complex and multi-jurisdictional commercial disputes spanning a range of sectors, including construction, mining and financial services.