van Faassen v. Lindberg, No. 24-1898 (4th Cir. July 14, 2026)[1]
This case arose from the insolvency of Nederlandsche Algemeene Maatschappij van Levensverzekering Conservatrix N.V. (“Conservatrix”), a Dutch life insurance company. Conservatrix’s trustees (“Petitioners”) initiated arbitration before the Netherlands Arbitration Institute after Respondents (the owners of Conservatrix) failed to maintain the company’s contractually required solvency capital ratio. In January 2020, the arbitrator ordered Respondents to restore the solvency ratio and imposed a €150 million penalty for noncompliance. The Dutch courts subsequently granted leave to enforce the award, and the enforcement order was upheld through the Dutch appellate process.
In 2023, Petitioners sought relief in federal court in North Carolina on two alternative grounds. First, they petitioned to confirm the arbitral award under the New York Convention, as implemented by Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”). Second, they sought recognition and enforcement of the Dutch judgment under the North Carolina Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. In ruling on Respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition, the district court held that the award was enforceable, that the FAA’s three-year statute of limitations for foreign awards was permissive, not mandatory, and that the Dutch judgment constituted a foreign-country judgment.
The principal issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether the language of Section 207 of the FAA, which provides that a party “may apply” to confirm a Convention award “[w]ithin three years after” the award is made, creates a mandatory statute of limitations. Petitioners argued that because the statute uses the word “may,” the three-year period is permissive. The court rejected that interpretation, reasoning that while parties are not required to seek confirmation, Congress expressly limited the exercise of that right to a three-year period. Reading the statute otherwise would effectively render the three-year language meaningless. The court therefore held that Section 207 establishes a mandatory limitations period and that petitions filed outside that period are time-barred.
In reaching that conclusion, the court distinguished its earlier decision in Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., which interpreted the one-year period in Section 9 of the FAA, governing domestic arbitration awards as permissive. The court emphasized that Section 9 and Section 207 appear in different chapters of the FAA, were enacted at different times, and govern different categories of arbitration awards. It further observed that, unlike in domestic arbitration, parties to foreign awards often have alternative enforcement mechanisms available, including recognition of foreign judgments confirming arbitral awards.
The Fourt Circuit agreed with the district court that Petitioners adequately stated a claim under North Carolina’s foreign-country judgment recognition statute. Although the statute does not apply directly to foreign arbitral awards, it does apply to judgments of foreign courts. The Dutch courts entered a final and enforceable judgment granting leave to enforce the arbitral award, and that judgment had been affirmed on appeal. The Fourth Circuit held that such a judgment falls within the scope of the North Carolina recognition statute, even though the judgment incorporated the arbitral award by reference.
The Fourt Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s order confirming the foreign arbitral award under the FAA because the petition was untimely filed. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the North Carolina Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Act applied to the Dutch judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on Petitioners’ motion to enforce the Dutch judgment under North Carolina law.
This article has been originally published in the North America newsletter.
